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Figure 5: Top: Expected total loss: comparison across
different network structures. Bottom: Expected de-
fender disutility in the generalized PA model as we
vary µ (keeping average degree fixed at 2). ER is also
shown for comparison.
of the standard results in network resilience, but the
two are in fact closely related, as we now demonstrate.
Superficially, the trend in the figure seems to follow
the common intuition in the resilience literature: as
the degree distribution becomes more inhomogeneous
(more star-like), it becomes more difficult to defend.
Observe, however, that ER is actually more difficult
to defend than PA with µ = 0. The lone difference of
the latter from ER is the fact that nodes that enter
earlier are more connected and, therefore, the degree
distribution in the PA variant should actually be more
inhomogeneous than ER! The answer is that random
connectivity combined with inhomogeneity of degrees
actually makes the distribution of utilities less homo-
geneous in PA with µ = 0, and, as a result, fewer
nodes on which defense can focus as compared to ER.
On the other hand, as the graph becomes more star-
like, the utilities of all nodes become quite similar; in
the limiting case, all nodes are only two hops apart,
and attacking any one of them yields a loss of many
as a result of cascades.
There is another aspect of network topology that has
an important impact on resilience: network density.
Figure 6 shows a plot of an Erdos-Renyi network with
the probability of an edge varying between 0.0025 to
0.08 (average degree between .25 and 8) and cost c
fixed at 0.04. Clearly, expected utility and loss of the
defender are increasing in density, but it is rather sur-
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Figure 6: Expected loss, cost, and their sum in 100-
node Erdos-Renyi networks as a function of network
density (equivalently, expected degree).
prising to observe how sharply they jump once average
degree exceeds 1 (the ER network threshold for a large
connected component); in any case, network density
has an unmistakable impact. The reason is intuitive:
increased density means more paths between targets,
and, consequently, greater likelihood of large cascades
in the event that a target is compromised. Total cost
initially increases in response to increased density, in
part to compensate for the increased vulnerability to
attacks, but eventually falls, since it is too expensive
to protect everything, and anything short of that is
largely ineffective.
7 Conclusion
We presented a framework for computing optimal ran-
domized security policies in network domains, extend-
ing previous linear programming approaches to Stack-
elberg security games in several ways. First, we ex-
tended previous linear programming techniques to in-
corporate benefits and costs of arbitrary security con-
figurations on individual assets. Second, we offered a
principled model of failure cascades that allows us to
capture both the direct and indirect value of assets,
and showed how to extend this model to capture un-
certainty about the structure of the interdependency
network. Third, we allowed the defender to account
for failures due to actual attacks, as well as those that
are a result of exogenous failures. Our results demon-
strate the value of our approach as compared to alter-
natives, and show that it is scalable to realistic security
settings. Furthermore, we used our framework to an-
alyze four models of interdependencies: two based on
random graph generation models, a simple model of in-
terdependence between critical infrastructure and key
resource sectors, and a model of the Fedwire interbank
payment network.
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